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CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AS A




Pursuant to the discretion Congress granted the federal judiciary by enacting the
Federal Probation Act, federal courts may impose charitable contributions as condi-
tions of probation for individuals convicted of crimes However, a majority of the
circuit courts have rejected the use of such probationary terms in sentencing convicted
corporations. In this Note, the author analyzes the legal and policy criticisms ofpuni-
tive charitable contributions. The author concludes that imposing such terms is au-
thorized by the Federal Probation Act and is in accord with public policy. Directing
charitable contributions to the nonprofit sector as a term of probation for convicted
corporations is more effective and beneficial to society than other traditional forms of
punishment
INTRODUCTION
THE SENTENCING OF convicted corporations poses a special
problem for judges. Because corporations are "artificial, legally-
created entities that owe their existence to a specific grant from the
state,"1 they cannot be treated like individuals for the purposes of
sentencing. The impossibility of imprisonment2 arguably makes a
fine the only sanction available to punish a corporation for its com-
mission of a crime.3
The primary rationale for punishing a corporation is deter-
rence;4 however, traditional remedies for white collar crimes are not
1. M. FREMoNT-SMrriH, PHILANTHROPY AND THE BusINEss CORPORATION 4 (1972).
2. See Note, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discre-
tion?, 52 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 637, 637 & n.7 (1984) [hereinafter Corporate Probation] (citing
Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959)); Note, Punishing the Cor-
poration: Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Probation, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 1069, 1070
(1984) [hereinafter Punishing the Corporation].
3. See Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 638. Note, however, that "[a] corporation
can be 'executed' by dissolution." Id at 637 n.7. But cf Note, Corporate Contributions to
Charity As a Condition of Probation Under the Federal Probation Act, 9 J. CORP. L. 241, 243
(1984) [hereinafter Corporate Contributions] ("dissolution of the corporation is not a practical
or effective sanction").
4. See Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1080-81. Giving private parties the
"right to maintain treble damage actions" against corporations is also thought to serve as a
deterrent to criminal behavior. Note, Corporations and the Federal Probation Act- Is the
Community an Aggrieved Party?: United States v. William Anderson Co., 58 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 163, 172 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Aggrieved Party].
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effective in addressing this concern.' The structure of the corpora-
tion, designed in part to protect investors from personal liability for
the corporation's debts,6 also may shield individuals from responsi-
bility for the corporation's criminal acts. The "separation of owner-
ship and control"7 or atomization of ownership which characterizes
the large corporation frequently makes it "difficult to identify the
individual responsible for the corporate misconduct."8 Moreover,
since "[flines... are viewed by many corporate offenders as merely
a cost of doing business," 9 some commentators argue that it is im-
possible to stigmatize a corporation 10 into avoiding further criminal
activity. Finally, the amount of the fines themselves is usually not
great enough to deter criminal activity,1" and even if it were, these
penalties can be passed on to shareholders or consumers, minimiz-
ing the deterrent effect.'"
Since corporate crime is of particular concern to society,1 3 the
5. See Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Cor-
porate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 362 (1979).
6. M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 1, at 4-5.
7. Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1069-70.
8. Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).
9. Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 639.
10. "There is very little evidence to suggest that the stigma of criminality means any-
thing very substantial in the life of a corporation." H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 361 (1968) (cited in Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1084 n.l 11).
Similarly, in United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982), overruled
by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984), the govern-
ment, in challenging the legality of charitable contributions as a condition of probation, ar-
gued "that since a corporation is but a fiction existing in contemplation of law, it can do
nothing but pay money, and hence can not be subjected to conditions designed to promote
rehabilitative behavior." William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 914. The court rejected the govern-
ment's argument:
[Miodern law regards the corporation as a normal and usual method of doing busi-
ness. Corporations today likewise claim to be good "citizens" of the community in
areas where they operate. They make contributions for charitable and educational
purposes in the territory served by their business, especially for the promotion of
research useful in their business. Their decision-making processes, acting through
human agents, affect for weal or woe the daily life of many communities. That such
decision-making processes can not be affected, in the area of collusive or monopolis-
tic pricing or other illegal restraints of trade, by rehabilitative measures and puni-
tive sanctions is an argument divorced from reality. Insistence upon the fiction
theory of corporations is today itself a fiction.
Id.
11. Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 639-40.
12. Id. at 640.
13. See, eg., White Collar and Corporate Crimes Require Creative Sentencing, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 1, 1986, at A30, col. 4 (suggests use of creative sentencing to require convicted
corporations to hire ombudsmen to "[work] within the corporation to prevent future criminal
violations"). See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, § 4, at 24, col. 5 ("To permit corporate
felons, whose products have killed and maimed scores of innocent people or polluted the
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law has sought alternative methods to combat it. By passing the
Federal Probation Act,14 Congress opened the door to "creative
sentencing" by the judiciary.15 As a result, placing convicted cor-
porations on probation, although problematic, 6 has become an ac-
cepted means of punishment.1 7 Traditionally, the terms of
probation have reduced fines payable to the federal treasury that
were imposed by the sentence, and have required instead that the
corporation make restitution to the aggrieved parties.'8
In an effort to deter a convicted corporation from committing
further criminal acts, as well as to discourage similar criminal activ-
ity by others,19 some courts have constructed probation conditions
that require the corporation to perform community service by do-
nating funds,20 services, 2 or both.22 In effect, by imposing these
environment... to be sentenced to community service when purse snatchers, car thieves and
shoplifters are sentenced to prison, ignores the constitutional principle of equal justice and
demeans the legal system.").
14. Federal Probation Act, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1982)).
15. "As a result of the ineffectiveness of fines, some courts have used the Probation Act
to develop additional sentencing alternatives." Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 641.
16. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
17. See, eg., United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982),
where the court held that it would not question the legality of corporate probation in general.
18. See, eg., United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1548 (8th Cir.
1984), in which the court stated:
The consistent strictness with which the courts have applied [§ 3651] leads us to
conclude that the only monetary payments permissible as conditions of probation
are those expressly authorized by the statute: payments to the treasury (fines), to
persons for whose support the defendant is legally responsible, or to aggrieved par-
ties who suffered actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction
was had, in the amount of such damage or loss.
Similarly, in Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 340 U.S. 891
(1950), the defendant was charged with crimes against several persons. The Ninth Circuit
held that a court can only order the defendant to pay, as a condition of probation, those
persons aggrieved by the precise acts for which the defendant was convicted.
19. See, eg., United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The court upheld a condition of probation requiring defendants to donate baked goods to
several local charities, since to limit probation conditions to restitution would curtail the
court's "ability to devise flexible sentences in the interests of justice." Id at 1171 (citing
United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982)).
20. See, eg., William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 912. In this case, one condition of proba-
tion for the corporation was the payment of funds in installments to charitable organizations
not actually injured by the corporation's criminal acts.
21. See, eg., Danilow Pastry, 563 F. Supp. at 1163. The defendant was required to
deliver $1200 worth of baked goods (to be valued at wholesale cost) each week for one year to
charitable organizations to be specified by the court in a subsequent order.
22. See, eg., United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982)
(defendant was required to loan an executive for one year to the National Alliance for Busi-
ness in development of its Community Alliance Program for Ex-Offenders (CAPE) and to
contribute $10,000 per violation to CAPE).
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conditions of probation, the judiciary compels defendant corpora-
tions to support the nonprofit sector when such corporations elect
to meet the terms of probation instead of serving the imposed sen-
tence. Although courts lack the authority to select unilaterally the
beneficiaries of a corporation's probationary terms,2 3 the Federal
Probation Act grants broad discretion to control the disposition of a
convicted corporation's "bounty." 24
This Note will focus on the legal and analytical problems that
these probation conditions create for the corporate and charitable
sectors. Part I will analyze judicial authority to place a corporate
defendant on probation under the Federal Probation Act.25 Part II
will address the split in the circuits engendered by the "permissive
language" of the Federal Probation Act.26 Part III will examine the
policy justifications for probation as applied to problems presented
by the sentencing of corporations,27 and Part IV will continue the
policy analysis by evaluating the effectiveness of probation for cor-
porations in light of the concerns discussed in Part III.28 Part V
23. Some courts have required a nexus between the beneficiary of the charitable contri-
bution and the crime for which the corporation was convicted. See Porth v. Templar, 453
F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The only limitation is that the conditions have a reasonable
relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public."). After Porth,
federal courts applied the "rational relation" test to conditions of corporate and individual
probation. For further discussion of this point, see Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2,
at 1075.
24. Although the rational relation test limits the court's authority to construct the terms
of probation in a given case, the court maintains a great deal of flexibility. See Corporate
Probation, supra note 2, at 643-44, which cites Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272
(1943) and Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932), for the proposition that trial
courts have "broad discretion to... decide what probation conditions are appropriate for
rehabilitation of a particular defendant." For an example of this discretion, see Danilow
Pastry, 563 F. Supp. at 1167-68, where the court required the defendant to contribute baked
goods to local charities as a condition of probation. The court concluded that its selection of
charitable organizations to receive the baked goods was not an abuse of discretion. The court
reasoned:
To the extent that the subject sentences provide restitution, such restitution is in
the nature of "symbolic restitution" designed primarily to deter future misconduct
on the part of the defendants rather than to provide compensation to their victims
.... Accordingly, the sentences are not limited by the requirements that any resti-
tution be only to "aggrieved parties."
Id. at 1169. The court justified its conclusion by the fact that consumers in general suffered
from the defendant's illegal price fixing, but there was no way to identify specifically the
injured parties. The court further reasoned that the beneficiaries were actually injured by the
defendant's wrongdoing, and the probation terms were related to the injury because they
made the defendant's baked goods available to those most in need. Id at 1169 & n.20.
25. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
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will focus on the judiciary's institutional competency to require
charitable contributions as a condition of probation for convicted
corporations.2 9 Part VI will address the implications of such proba-
tion conditions on the nonprofit sector.30 Finally, this Note con-
cludes that charitable contributions as conditions of probation for
convicted corporations involve the nonprofit sector in the continu-
ing fight against corporate crime in a way that is consistent with the
nonprofit sector's traditional role in our society.3
I. THE FEDERAL PROBATION ACT
The federal courts' power to place a defendant on probation is
purely statutory. In Ex parte United States,32 the Supreme Court
held that the authority to suspend sentence is inherently legisla-
tive.33 In response to the holding, Congress enacted the Federal
Probation Act of 1925, 34 which enables federal district court judges
to impose upon a criminal offender, in lieu of a "statutory sen-
tence,"135 the conditions of probation which "they deem best"36
under the circumstances. Furthermore, "the statute specifically
29. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
32. 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
33. Id. at 52. The court reasoned that "the authority to define and fix punishment for
crime is legislative... and... the right to relieve from the punishment... belongs to the
executive department." Id. at 42. See Note, United States v. William Anderson Co.: Mone-
tary Conditions of Probation Under the Federal Probation Act, 69 IowA L. R.v. 1147, 1150
(1984) [hereinafter Monetary Conditions] ("The Court found that probation authority ema-
nated solely from the legislature and that only congressional authorization would secure the
future exercise of probationary powers by federal courts.") (citations omitted).
34. See supra note 14. See also United States v. Fultz, 482 F.2d 1, 2 (8th Cir. 1973)
(Congress enacted the Federal Probation Act, which vested the power to place defendants on
probation in the district courts, in response to Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916)).
35. Monetary Conditions, supra note 33, at 1147. Section 3651 of the Federal Probation
Act provides in relevant part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the
United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the
public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition
or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-
May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and
May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual
damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and
May be required to provide for the support of any persons, for whose support he
is legally responsible....
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
36. Monetary Conditions, supra note 33, at 1147.
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lists three monetary conditions of probation: [a]n offender may be
required to pay a fine, to make restitution . . . to the aggrieved
party, and to make support payments to legal dependents. ' 37 The
Act is rehabilitative in nature rather than punitive or deterrent. 38
Several subsequent circuit court opinions interpreted the Fed-
eral Probation Act as vesting federal district courts with the power
to place a criminal defendant on probation.39 The phrase "criminal
defendant" has been interpreted to include corporations as well as
individuals. 4
More controversial, however, has been the issue succinctly
stated in United States v. Missouri Valley Construction :4 whether a
district court may substitute for a fine the probationary condition
that a corporation contribute funds to a charitable organization that
has not been actually harmed42 by the corporation's criminal of-
fense.4 3 Community service and charitable contributions are com-
monly accepted as terms of probation for individuals;' however,
the imposition of such conditions on corporations calls into ques-
37. Id.
38. See Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 638. See also Aggrieved Party, supra note 4,
at 164: "The primary purpose of the Act is to provide criminals who apparently are capable
of rehabilitation time to reform when it is clear that actual service of their sentence would
make rehabilitation unlikely."
39. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 56, 58 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
845 (1980) (the validity of probation conditions must be tested under the Federal Probation
Act, because the district court lacks the inherent power to suspend sentence); United States v.
Fultz, 482 F.2d 1, 2 (8th Cir. 1973) (same); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d
58, 60 (7th Cir. 1972) (same).
40. Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 642, citing United States v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 465 F.2d 58, 60-61 (7th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit failed "to provide any rationale
for placing corporations on probation .... [T]he court simply looked to the federal criminal
code . . . [and] reasoned that, because corporations are subject to the criminal code and
because the Probation Act is part of that criminal code, corporations can be put on proba-
tion." Corporate Contributions, supra note 3, at 244 (citations omitted).
41. 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984). See supra note 10.
42. The Federal Probation Act expressly grants the court the authority to impose as a
condition of probation the payment of restitution to parties actually harmed by the offense:
"While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant - . . May be required
to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the
offense for which conviction was had .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
43. Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1544.
44. In several cases in which both corporations and individuals were convicted and
placed on probation, the government challenged the legality of the conditions of probation
only as applied to the corporate defendants. The legality of community service and charitable
contribution sanctions imposed on individual defendants was not questioned. See, eg., Wil-
liam Anderson, 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982); Danilow Pastry, 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1163 & n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Kahn, Charitable Contributions As Conditions of Probation, 48
FED. PROBATION 80, 80 (Dec. 1984) ("the cases in which charitable contributions have been
challenged principally involve corporate defendants").
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tion the efficacy and desirability of charitable contributions in light
of the unique characteristics possessed by corporate entities.
II. INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL PROBATION ACT IN THE
CONTEXT OF CORPORATE PROBATION
The legality of imposing charitable contributions as a condition
of probation on convicted corporations has engendered a split in the
circuits, 5 with a majority denying the validity of such action."
The debate "has focused on the statutory interpretation of the Fed-
eral Probation Act."'47 At the center of the controversy is the so-
called "permissive" language of section 3651: "upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems best," "among the conditions
thereof," and "may be required."48  Unfortunately, the legislative
history of the Federal Probation Act does little to resolve the ambi-
guity of the language that addresses acceptable conditions of proba-
tion.49 Moreover, most courts fail to provide their reasoning behind
the probationary terms which they impose; those that do merely
45. See United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1984).
46. Kahn, supra note 44, at 80. As a matter of fact, federal courts of appeal in seven
circuits, namely, the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth, have "con-
sistently limited monetary conditions of probation to those specifically listed in the Probation
Act." Monetary Conditions, supra note 33, at 1154-56. With respect to charitable contribu-
tions as a condition of probation, the Tenth, Fourth, Eighth and Third circuits have clearly
rejected "the legality of this type of probation condition." Kahn, supra note 44, at 80. See
United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Wright Contracting Co., 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Missouri Valley Con-
struction Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984), United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746
F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 645-46.
47. Note, Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Federal Probation for Corporate
Defendants: A Controversial Sanction Under New Law, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 530, 533
(1985) [hereinafter A Controversial Sanction].
48. See id. at 533 & n.16. The following courts have interpreted this language to permit
district courts to impose charitable contributions on corporations as conditions of probation:
William Anderson, 698 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wright Contracting
Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 215-16 (D. Md. 1983), rev'd, 728 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984); Danilow
Pastry, 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
49.
18 U.S.C. 3651 authorizes the imposition of probation "upon such terms and condi-
tions as the court deems best." The section does not mandate the imposition of any
condition of probation but does list several specific conditions which may be re-
quired, i.e., paying of a fine, making of restitution, supporting of dependents, sub-
mitting to treatment of addiction, or residing in or participating in the programs of
a residential community treatment center. These, however, in view of the broad
general grant of statutory authority, have been viewed as examples of, rather than
limitations on, the kinds of conditions that a court may place on probation.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 93, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3182, 3276. See also Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1076 n.54 (further
discussion of ambiguity surrounding language of the statute).
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comment that employing charitable contributions in probation
"helps integrate defendants into the working environment" and fos-
ters in them a "sense of social responsibility.""0  Examination of
recent decisions interpreting the language of the Federal Probation
Act illustrates the legal problems that imposition of charitable ac-
tivity on corporations as a condition of probation presents.
The approach adopted by the majority of the circuits interprets
the Federal Probation Act as limiting the legally permissible proba-
tion conditions which a district court may impose on a defendant."1
These courts read the applicable language of section 3651 as exem-
plary, except that allfines imposed as a condition of probation must
fall into one of the three types enumerated in the statute. 2 Since
contributions to charitable organizations not actually harmed by a
corporation's transgressions do not fall within that language, the
government has generally opposed such terms of probation. 3
50.
[I]n many cases community service sentences better serve the goals of the criminal
justice system than mere fines or imprisonment.... Such sentences require that the
defendant become personally involved-devoting both time and energy-in a pro-
ject that serves the public interest, and thereby inculcate in the defendant a sense of
social responsibility.
United States v. John Scher Presents, Inc., 746 F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1984).
51. A number of circuits (namely, the Tenth, Fourth, Eighth and Third), have "ruled
that all monetary probation terms are governed by the restitution section of the Act. Thus,
unless a charitable organization is a direct victim of the crime, it cannot be a beneficiary of a
monetary probation condition." Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 646 (citations omitted).
See also Kahn, supra note 44, at 80. For example, in John Scher, 746 F.2d 959, the corpora-
tion was convicted of antitrust violations. For one of the terms of its probation, the trial
court ordered the corporation to promote a concert to raise and donate $100,000 to charities
selected by the probation department. Id. at 960. The Third Circuit rejected the probation
terms on appeal because it found that the terms did not involve a community service; rather,
the terms just directed the corporation to conduct a normal business venture and donate the
profits to charity. The court found no rehabilitative qualities in the probation, viewing it as
mere payment of funds to a charity rather than to the government. Id. at 963. Similar argu-
ments are found in Prescon (10th Cir.), Missouri Valley (8th Cir.), and Wright Contracting
(4th Cir.).
52. See, e.g., Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1547-48, 1550; Wright Contracting, 728 F.2d
at 649; Prescon, 695 F.2d at 1242-43. See supra note 35 for the applicable language of section
3651.
53. See, eg., Wright Contracting, 728 F.2d at 651. In Wright Contracting, the govern-
ment opposed probation terms that required the corporation convicted of antitrust violations
to contribute funds to a city jobs program. The court paraphrased the government's argu-
ment as follows:
[T]he condition imposed manifestly has essentially a restitutive or reparative
purpose, albeit an avowedly "symbolic" one designed to deter and punish as well.
Since the payment is not ordered to "aggrieved parties" and does not purport to
reflect "actual damages or loss caused by the offense," it does not meet the statutory
limitations and is illegal in the government's view."
Id. Furthermore, in Missouri Valley, the court stated:
The imposition of a fine for a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and its
[Vol. 37:569
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Proponents of the use of charitable contributions as terms of
probation, in contrast, read the statutory language as completely
unrestrictive. For example, the courts in United States v. William
Anderson Co.,54 (although subsequently overruled), and United
States v. Danilow Pastry Co.,5  concluded that section 3651 lists
three conditions that unquestionably may legally be imposed as
terms of probation. Both the William Anderson and Danilow Pastry
courts ground their liberal interpretations of section 3651 on the
broad purpose of the Federal Probation Act.16 These courts also
question the majority approach's differentiation between individual
and corporate criminal defendants. They find this approach incon-
sistent in challenging probation conditions that require charitable
contributions imposed on corporations yet acceding to the same
terms when applied to individuals. 57 Although a rational relation-
suspension under 18 U.S.C. § 3651, remain discretionary with the sentencing court,
but once a fine has been imposed as part of a sentence, the substitution of a payment
to some other entity in lieu of the fine must satisfy the strict requirements of the
monetary-payment provisions of section 3651.
Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1550.
54. 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982), overruled by United States v. Missouri Valley Constr.
Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984). Although it no longer has the force of law, the Anderson
opinion presents some compelling analysis, as the Missouri Valley dissenters illustrate by re-
ferring to it. Missouri Valley, 741 F.Zd at 1551-55 (Gibson, J., dissenting). See infra note 56
and accompanying text.
55. 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
56.
As the Court reasoned in Anderson .... corporations play a predominate role in
our society, and their essence is far more than the legal fiction giving rise to their
existence. Their management and functioning are intrinsically that of the individu-
als managing and controlling the organization. Insofar as the conditions of proba-
tion in Anderson affect the managers and decisionmakers and recognize the
interrelationship between those individuals and the corporation, the Anderson con-
ditions are in full accord with the purposes and goals of section 3651.
Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1554 (Gibson, J., dissenting). See infra note 75. The Danilow
Pastry court, espousing the same view, reasoned, "[Tihe purpose of the Act, to give judges
broad discretion in fashioning sentences suggests that implied exemptions from that authority
ought to be narrowly construed." Danilow Pastry, 563 F. Supp. at 1171 (footnote omitted).
The dissent in Missouri Valley also takes this approach:
The contribution of the corporation can and should be used to fund the public
service activities of the individual defendants who are officers in that corporation.
To conclude that such use of probation is prohibited by rules of construction based
on a negative implication is simply to overlook both the purpose and broad lan-
guage of section 3651.
Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1553 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
57. William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 911; Danilow Pastry, 563 F. Supp. at 1163. But see
United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489, 490-92 (5th Cir. 1986), in which an individual was
convicted of conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act. The Fifth Circuit rejected the district
court's attempt to reduce the amount of the fine if Haile chose to " 'divert' [up to 25% of the
fine] to an approved charitable organization." Id. at 490. The court held that without statu-
tory authority a district court may not order a defendant to make a charitable contribution as
a condition of probation. Id. at 492. The court reasoned that although the district court may
19871
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ship must exist between the probation and the offense whether the
defendant is an individual or a corporation, 8 strict adherence to the
majority approach's reading of section 3651 would preclude all use
of charitable and community service conditions of probation for
both individuals and corporations, in contravention of current
practice.5 9
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROBATION
The majority approach prevents liberal employment of charita-
ble contributions as a condition of probation for convicted corpora-
tions. Analysis of the policy considerations that underlie probation,
however, indicates that such conditions are socially desirable.
While the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation,' the chief
rationale for punishing a convicted corporation is deterrence. 6
These differing sentencing goals have created a tension in the area
of corporate probation, leading to an analytically flawed judicial
position.62
"properly take note of the charitable spirit of a defendant, even a charitable spirit that has
flowered only under the shadow of the jail wall", id., it lacks the authority to "compel chari-
table contributions." Id. The court recognized the rehabilitative value of charitable contri-
butions as conditions of probation and the fact that such contributions may benefit society
more than fines paid to the federal treasury, but found that "[w]ithout a statutory footing...
the [district] courts are not free to make these policy judgments." Id. Ultimately, the court's
holding rested on its characterization of the probation conditions in question as "improperly
diverting funds away from the Treasury." Id.
58. See, eg., Fiore v. United States, 696 F.2d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1980); Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975). See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
59. See, eg., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, in
opposition to the "restitution" restriction adhered to by the majority approach, given the
broad discretion traditionally granted to courts to devise conditions of probation, one can
argue that "the fact that the [Federal Probation] Act contains a provision for restitution
should not limit the power of courts to fashion monetary conditions of probation ..
Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 646-47.
60. See Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1080-81. See also Corporate Proba-
tion, supra note 2, at 657. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. As one author explains,
"[a]t the heart of the concept [of rehabilitation] ... is the idea that the offender's behavior is
changed so that he does not commit further offenses." Corporate Contributions, supra note 3,
at 261.
61. Corporate Contributions, supra note 3, at 261.
62. See Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 637-39, 657-61 for a proposal of a "Com-
prehensive Crime Control Bill," whose scheme includes the goals of deterrence and punish-
ment in addition to that of rehabilitation.
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A. Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Probation for
Individuals
When the terms of probation require community service or
charitable contributions, society benefits in many ways. These ben-
efits are not attainable through sentences of imprisonment or fines
paid to the federal treasury. Aside from the "therapeutic" effects
which such probation may have on a defendant,63 society will save
on prison expenses, benefit from the funds or services provided to
charitable or community organizations, and enjoy a sense of vindi-
cation."4 These effects reflect the underlying purposes of probation
in general. Therefore, they must be given serious consideration in
the context of probation for corporations.
B. Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Probation for
Corporations
The corporation is a powerful and highly visible entity in to-
day's society. It is an institution that exists by a legal grant of au-
thority,6" and one cannot ignore its presence and its intimate
connection with natural persons.
Nevertheless, those who oppose the imposition of charitable
contributions as a probational term for corporations continue to
perceive the corporation in a "textbook" fashion. They argue that
the corporation is a fictional entity, and that it is therefore impossi-
ble to rehabilitate.66 They persist in viewing the corporation as a
profit generating machine devoid of conscience, even though people
create, drive, and direct this engine of commerce. This reasoning
leads them to conclude that the more significant advantages of pro-
bation do not apply to corporations.67
Most of the justifications for probation for individuals, however,
also support the use of probation in the corporate context. Admit-
tedly, because a corporation is a non-physicial entity which cannot
be imprisoned, the argument that probation benefits society by re-
ducing prison expenses does not apply.68 Rehabilitation, societal
benefits, and vindication, however, do in fact justify probationary
63. "The offender is 'treated' in a manner that is therapeutic. What constitutes thera-
peutic treatment, though, is unknown. Presumably, it is treatment that counteracts the
causes of the offender's unlawful behavior." Corporate Contributions, supra note 3, at 261.
64. See Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1081.
65. See supra note I and accompanying text.
66. See Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1084.
67. See id. at 1081-85.
68. Id. at 1081.
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sentencing of convicted corporations.69
IV. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AS EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS
FOR CONVICTED CORPORATIONS
Those who criticize the use of charitable contributions as condi-
tions of probation for convicted corporations argue that they lend
themselves to "leniency... [and] susceptibility to corporate manip-
ulation."7 0 As a result, they neither effectively punish, deter, or re-
habilitate the corporation,71 nor do they satisfy society's need for a
sense of vindication. However, upon examination of the effects of
requiring a convicted corporation to contribute to charitable institu-
tions or to perform community service work, one sees that these
concerns do not provide sufficient justification to prevent courts
from imposing such sanctions.
A. Getting Off Easy
Critics point out that the alternative to probation for the indi-
vidual is incarceration, while the alternative to probation for the
corporation is simply a fine.72 This circumstance lends an appear-
ance of leniency on the corporations, since both sentences involve
(merely) monetary payment as punishment. This argument may
undermine the rationales in favor of corporate probation, for the
corporation may not sense as greatly as a convicted individual that
the court is giving it a second chance.73 Moreover, corporate pro-
bation may perpetuate a perception in the mind of the general pub-
lic that the corporation is "getting off easy." In cases like Danilow
Pastry,74 however, where the corporation operates in an economi-
cally depressed area, the corporation may not be able to bear the
burden of paying a substantial fine while still conducting its opera-
tions.7 5 In such a case, probation involving charitable contributions
69. Id. at 1081-82.
70. Id. at 1083.
71. Ia at 1084-85.
72. Id. at 1081.
73. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) ("Probation is thus conferred as a
privilege and cannot be demanded as a right. It is a matter of favor, not of contract."). But
see United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[P]robation is not a favor of
the court bestowed upon defendant as a relief from imprisonment that may be conditioned in
any manner the trial judge sees fit, neither does a probationer have a right to be free from
conditions that severely restrain his freedom of action. The judge may, in fact is obliged to,
view probation as a substitute for imprisonment.").
74. 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See supra note 19.
75.
[F]ines substantial enough to achieve the appropriate measure of deterrence would
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of goods or services and reduced fines may be a welcome alterna-
tive. The institution will pay for its crimes, and the community will
benefit both from the continued existence of the corporation, and
from the court-ordered charitable contributions.
This first concern over the perception of leniency focuses on the
deterrent value of charitable contributions as a condition of corpo-
rate probation.76 The purposes of probation, however, are to reha-
bilitate the convict, as well as to deter similar criminal conduct in
the future. Although the dollar value of charitable contributions
may not exceed the dollar value of fines payable to the govern-
ment,77 and although the payment of charitable contributions may
benefit the corporation in the public eye, probation is not intended
to be a trivial sentence. It may very well rehabilitate a convicted
corporation by allowing it to continue its business.
Proponents of using charitable contributions in probation for
corporations contend that "[a] court-ordered payment to charity
should be as effective as a fine in punishing the corporate offender
and deterring future violations by that offender and other corpora-
bankrupt the corporate defendants. Such a sentence would cause widespread unem-
ployment among the bakeries' employees, damage the economies of the communi-
ties in which the plants are located, and ironically, diminish competition. Hence,
this is precisely the overly harsh sentence that the Probation Act was designed to
avoid.
Danilow Pastry, 563 F. Supp. at 1166-67 (footnotes omitted).
The pastry company operated in an area with high unemployment and a disintegrating
tax base. Had the court imposed the higher fines, the corporation would have been forced out
of the area, ultimately imposing further burdens on the local consumers by costing many of
them their jobs, and by depriving their community of much needed tax revenues. Id at 1172.
See also Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 640.
76. See Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1082.
77. But see Corporate Contributions, supra note 3, where the author advocates the posi-
tion that charitable contributions may cost the corporation more than the imposition of a fine
and thereby will better serve the rehabilitative function of probation. He argues that since a
corporation's actions "are governed by human beings making decisions about corporate pol-
icy.., any attempt to rehabilitate the corporation will have to affect the people in charge of
corporate decision-making." Id at 262. He goes on to point out "the voluntary aspects of
probationary terms," id at 263, and states that the choices put to corporate decisionmakers
with respect to selecting "which probation option to pursue will impinge upon and disrupt
the decision-maker's regular schedule and will therefore be more likely to impress upon him
the costs of criminal violations. Furthermore, to the extent that the decision-making process
involves a group, substantially more individuals will be made aware of the costs of criminal-
ity." Id (citations omitted).
Finally, there are two additional reasons for which charitable contributions serve to reha-
bilitate the corporation. "First, the payments to charity [can] generate publicity that in turn
affects the decision-maker." Id at 263-64. Second, "[a] corporate decision-maker [might]
react more positively to making payments to charity than to making payments to the govern-
ment, because the government might be considered an adversary while the charity might not
be so considered." Id at 264.
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tions."7 8 The sentencing judge in William Anderson justified his use
of creative sentencing as follows:
The alternative sentences will be designed to be firm, specific,
unpleasant for the defendants and constructive for them and
others. They have the additional strength of being aimed in most
instances at helping directly people who are in the criminal jus-
tice population or are prime candidates for it. If the community
service features of the sentences are correctly devised they will
not have decreased the amount of punishment, but will have in-
creased the usefulness and decreased the expensiveness of it.79
In his Missouri Valley dissent, Judge Gibson lauded the William
Anderson court's use of charitable contributions as a probationary
condition:
It is the conditions of probation which present the most likely
avenue for bringing about corporate changes of behavior. In ad-
dition to imposing particular procedural and structural require-
ments on a corporation as terms of probation, the Anderson
approach has the practical effect of tying together the probation
of the individual and corporate defendants with at least as great a
possibility of achieving the desired goals of probation as it is pos-
sible to reach in any case where probation is utilized.80
Those who reject the extension of charitable contributions to or-
ganizations not directly injured by a corporation's crimes claim that
they do so after examining the reality of the situation. They argue
that courts impose corporate fines payable to the federal govern-
ment purely to punish, and that fines paid to third parties are repar-
ative or restitutional in nature.81 Therefore, the latter must only be
made to aggrieved parties who are thus deserving of reparative or
restitutional damages.82 This argument, though, overlooks the de-
terrent and rehabilitative purposes of probation. Courts that have
supported using charitable contributions as a condition of corporate
probation view them as a positive means of modifying corporate
behavior, rather than as a method of compensation to injured third
parties.83 These courts reason that "the beneficiaries need not be
78. See A Controversial Sanction, supra note 3, at 541.
79. Quoted in William Anderson, 698 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1982).
80. Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d 1542, 1554 (8th Cir. 1984) (Gibson, J., concurring in re-
sult and dissenting) (footnote omitted). Judge Gibson concurred in the majority's rejection of
the terms of probation only because the probation did not connect the payment of money and
the charitable work the officers of the corporation would perform as part of their probation.
Instead, the condition was "simply the payment of money to a designated charity, without
any tie to the probation of the individuals, precisely the type of payment condemned in Pres-
con and Wright Contracting." Id.
81. See, eg., Wright Contracting, 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984).
82. Id.
83. In United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213 (D. Md. 1983), the
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those directly aggrieved by the violations so long as there is a rea-
sonable relationship between them and the defendants' illegal con-
duct, and so long as the community service serves to reverse the
damage done by that conduct." 84
B. Corporate Manipulation
Similarly, the concern that charitable contributions as condi-
tions of probation may be used by the corporation to its advantage
is not completely valid. At the core of this anxiety is the fear that a
corporation cannot be stigmatized. If corporations were truly im-
mune to stigma, it would be impossible to justify, on this basis, the
punishment of any corporation convicted of a criminal offense. In
any event, because corporations rely on their reputation to market
and sell their goods or services, they will suffer whenever their repu-
tations among potential consumers are tarnished.
A corporation on probation may publicize its charitable contri-
butions in order to to generate a positive public image, even when
such contributions are made in compliance with the terms of the
corporation's probation. This kind of manipulation, however, may
be prevented or its effects reversed by informing the public of the
probationary terms.85 An analogous concern is that a corporation
trial court characterized the probation, in part, as a "Corporate Penance program [that] is
not restitutional, reparative, or in any way connected with reimbursing anyone for losses
sustained as a result of this specific crime. It is instead designed to punish defendant, specifi-
cally deter defendant, and generally deter other corporations contemplating similar criminal
activity." I at 214. See also John Scher, 746 F.2d at 962 (trial court did not see payments
as restitution, but as community service designed to rehabilitate and deter); Danilow Pastry,
563 F. Supp. at 1172 (probation designed to deter, to rehabilitate, and to preserve jobs at
defendant's plants, rather than primarily to compensate consumers).
84. Danilow Pastry, 563 F. Supp. at 1171.
85. Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1087 & no.128-31. The court in Ander-
son also emphasized the role that publicity plays in creative sentencing:
The deterrent effect of punishment is heightened if it inflicts disgrace and contumely
in a dramatic and spectacular manner. The arsenal of the sentencing judge should
contain more than the traditional weapons of fine and imprisonment simpliciter.
Some of the old time punishments (such as the pillory, stocks, whipping post, and
ducking-stool) might seem "cruel and unusual" today, but painful publicity is not
relished by corporate tycoons. Public opinion can be sharply focussed on culprits
engaged in antisocial anti-competitive conduct by means of "creative" sentencing.
Measures are effective which have the impact of the "scarlet letter" described by
Nathaniel Hawthorne, or the English equivalent of "wearing papers" in the vicinity
of Westminster Hall like a sandwich-man's sign describing the culprit's
transgressions.
698 F.2d at 913 (footnote omitted).
In Danilow Pastry, the court stated that the probation requirements it imposed on the
defendant included enough public exposure to enhance the effectiveness of charitable contri-
butions in rehabilitating a corporation:
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may enjoy a tax deduction for contributions made in compliance
with the terms of its probation. 6 However, the sentencing court
may include in the corporation's probation a condition prohibiting
the corporation from taking such a deduction. 7
V. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCY
Opponents of the use of charitable contributions as conditions of
probation in the corporate context also question the institutional
competency of the judiciary to impose such conditions. Charitable
contributions, when made in lieu of payment of fines, divert funds
from the federal treasury. Control over federal funds is inherently a
legislative function, 8 and subscribers to the majority view argue
that, since the Federal Probation Act delegates to district courts the
authority to award federal funds only to aggrieved parties or to a
defendant's legal dependents, a court that imposes a charitable con-
tribution on a corporation as a term of probation abuses its
discretion."9
In many of the cases in which the courts adhere to the majority
rule, the government is the party challenging the terms of the cor-
poration's probation.90 In light of the large sums of money that can
be extracted from corporate defendants, the government's objection
to the "payment of fine[s] to a party other than the government,
The sentences require the corporations to perform community service by pro-
viding their products at no charge to needy members of the community. In this
way the wrongdoings of these defendants are called to public attention, the public is
made aware of the community service and symbolic restitution that these violators
will make, punishment is increased beyond what fines could extract and yet the
needs of the innocent employees, the customers, and the communities are secured.
563 F. Supp. at 1167.
86. A Controversial Sanction, supra note 35, at 536-37 & n.33.
87. See, eg., William Anderson, 698 F.2d at 912 (sentence provided that if the defendant
paid funds in specified installments to named charitable organization, it could not take a
charitable tax deduction for the contributions). Although William Anderson was overruled
by Missouri Valley, the latter court did not challenge or address this particular probation
condition.
88. Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1549-50. See also Kahn, supra note 44, at 80: The
Missouri Valley court noted that "the effect of the monetary-payment conditions would be to
transfer to a private entity designated by the district court a substantial sum of money that
would otherwise likely have gone, in the form of a fine, to the federal treasury." Id See also
supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
89. Kahn, supra note 44, at 80. See also United States v. Haile, 795 F.2d 489, 492 (5th
Cir. 1986) (judicial imposition of charitable contribution as condition of probation for indi-
vidual without statutory authority characterized as "improperly diverting fines away from
the Treasury" and therefore beyond the "limits of judicial authority").
90. This was the case in Missouri Valley and Wright Contracting as well as in United
States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
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which serves no special correction purpose"91 may be largely fiscal.
However, other objections focus on the relationship between the
trial judge and the nonprofit sector.
Commentators have noted the extent to which trial judges are
free to use their discretion in setting the terms of probation.9 2 Some
argue that "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we
give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intol-
erable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." 93
Among the concerns raised by the probationary power is the court's
competency to choose the beneficiaries of the charitable contribu-
tion which it will impose. The Missouri Valley court argued that
"[t]he courts are ill-equipped to pick and choose, among countless
worthy causes, which nonaggrieved charitable organizations should
receive large sums of money that would otherwise be paid to the
treasury as fines." 94 This concern is magnified when a court per-
mits "the corporate defendant to choose a favorite beneficiary for
the receipt of these funds." 95
In addition, "[t]he involvement of the courts in the selection of
the recipients of such benefits raises... the prospect of conflicts of
interest and unnecessary criticism of the courts."96 This is espe-
cially true when charities that receive funds as a result of corporate
probation are seen as beneficiaries "presumably acting in some way
as 'surrogates' for the public as the actually 'aggrieved party.' ,9
Rivalry among potential surrogates is another possible problem.98
Moreover, because the public has no voice in the judicial process,
the judge's discretion in choosing a beneficiary may lead to public
91. John Scher, 746 F.2d at 962.
92. See, e-g., Corporate Probation, supra note 2, at 643-44.
93. Punishing the Corporation, supra note 2, at 1083-84 n.106 (quoting M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES-LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972)).
94. Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1550.
95. Id. at 1555 (Gibson, C.J., concurring in result and dissenting).
96. Id. at 1550.
97. Wright Contracting, 728 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1984). Furthermore:
By this decision we do not hold that under no circumstances may avowedly
restitutive or reparative payments be ordered as valid conditions of probation for
persons convicted of crimes causing direct economic damage or loss to the public at
large.... In this opinion we have held that... private charitable organizations
[may not] be considered proper surrogates for the public at large as a party directly
"aggrieved" by a criminal offense within the meaning of the statute. This does not
foreclose all possibility that "actual damages" might be legally determined and a
proper surrogate identified to act as direct conduit for restitutive payments to the
affected public in an appropriate case. That case is not before us.
Id at 653 n.2.
98. Id. at 653.
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criticism of the use of charitable contributions as conditions of cor-
porate probation.
Despite the validity of these arguments, the determination of a
charitable purpose has been a traditional judicial function.9 9 The
selection of a recipient of a court-ordered charitable contribution is
consistent with this traditional role. Moreover, the positive effects
that such charitable contributions have on both the convicted cor-
poration and on society diminish the concern of these critisms.
VI. IMPACT ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
When a court imposes a charitable contribution on a corpora-
tion as a condition of probation, the charity functions as a conduit
between the corporation and the general public.l"o In effect, the
public is the ultimate beneficiary of this type of probation.
Although the benefits flow indirectly to the community through the
charitable organization, this method is highly effective in providing
ongoing services to the attenuated victims of the corporate offense,
or when the slight benefits provided by a direct award to individuals
is substantially outweighed by the benefit that a large contribution
to a local charitable organization would provide to the community
as a whole. 101 This function is quasi-governmental, and it is a legiti-
mate function of the nonprofit sector.102 To deny the courts the
opportunity to make such awards would certainly impair the ability
of the nonprofit sector to proffer services to the public not provided
by the government.
Critics oppose the payment of "government" funds to an entity
99. In charitable trust law, courts traditionally have had the power to determine the
scope of charitable purpose. See, eg., IV A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368 (3d ed.
1967). When state legislatures address the validity or enforceability of charitable trusts,
"[t]he statutes... are often somewhat rambling in the choice of adjectives." Id. § 368 (3d ed.
Supp. 1985). This suggests that courts are well-suited to choosing the beneficiaries of charita-
ble contributions.
100. A Controversial Sanction, supra note 47, at 546.
101. A supermarket pricefixing case provides an excellent illustration of this point. In
1976, three large supermarket chains in the Greater Cleveland area were prosecuted for
pricefixing. Two years later the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio entered a settlement order requiring them to reimburse the local citizens with $1.00
coupons; two per household redeemable per month. A contribution of perishable food items
equal in value to the amount of the coupons not redeemed per month was to be given to the
city's food bank. Clearly the locality realized a greater benefit as a whole from the contribu-
tions of food to the food bank than it did from the aggregate individual savings. See Cleve-
land Sun Press, March 20, 1986, at Al.
102. See COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN
AMERICA 31-32, 38-49 (1979) [hereinafter Filer Commission Report].
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that has no specific "correctional purpose." 103 Although this is
true, such a purpose is completely consistent with the role that non-
profit organizations have played in society." 4 "The sector ideally
should not compete with the government so much as complement it
and help humanize it.. ."1,o The nonprofit sector is neither gov-
ernment nor business, but serves as a bridge between the two. 10 6
"Nonprofit organizations frequently serve to stimulate and coordi-
nate activities in which government or business or both interact
with voluntary groups to pursue public purposes.... The fact that
[they] have neither commercial interests to pursue nor official status
often makes them best suited to act as intermediary or coordinator
in activities involving government and business."' 7 Therefore, the
beneficiaries of charitable contributions imposed on corporations as
conditions of probation are especially suited to oversee the rehabili-
tation of corporations that are convicted of corporate crimes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Generally, charitable contributions as conditions of probation
for a corporation cannot be considered fines because they are not
paid to the government. Neither can they be characterized as resti-
tution or reparation because the organization that receives them is
not injured by the corporation's offense. Moreover, they cannot be
deemed support because the corporation has no legal duty to fund
the charity. 08 Therefore, the majority of circuit courts hold that
these contributions are outside of a district court's authority to set
the terms of probation for a corporate defendant, 0 9 even though
such terms are acceptable conditions of probation for individual
offenders.
This majority approach, however, ignores the important deter-
rent, rehabilitative, and public benefit functions that such probation
arrangements can provide. Although judicial allocation of these
charitable contributions poses some valid institutional competency
concerns, the ramifications of eliminating this means of modifying
103. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
104. See Filer Commission Report, supra note 98, at 38-49 for a description of functions
that the nonprofit sector has served to date, including research, public policy development,




108. See Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56 (1982). See also A Controversial
Sanction, supra note 47, at 536.
109. See, eg., A Controversial Sanction, supra note 47, at 536.
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corporate behavior cannot be ignored. The humanistic endeavors of
nonprofit organizations have long served a vital function with re-
spect to mitigating the capitalistic mentality engrained in today's
society. Although it has no inherent power to do so, the charitable
organization plays an important part in the rehabilitation of corpo-
rate criminals. This potential seems sufficient to justify the use of
charitable contributions as a condition of probation for defendant
corporations, even when the charitable beneficiaries of the contribu-
tions are not directly harmed by the corporation's offense.
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